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CHAPTER 1 
 
EUROPEAN UNION, TURKEY AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: THE FAILURE OF 
A CATALYST 
 
GEORGE KYRIS 
 
Introduction  
 
The Cyprus problem has always been a 'cornerstone' of Turkish foreign policy. For years, 
Ankara followed a rather inflexible stance towards the prospects of solution. The solution is 
understood here as the compromised form of a negotiated solution for a united Cyprus as a 
bizonal, bicommunal federation that both communities and the international world are 
formally committed to.  However, the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU 
membership in 1999 meant to profoundly impact the country's position towards the inter-
communal dispute in the island. With the resolution of the Cyprus problem included in its 
accession conditionality, Turkey made a spectacular shift of policy and supported the 'Annan 
Plan', the United Nations (UN)-proposed blueprint for the reunification of the island based on 
a loose federation. Despite the support of Turkish-Cypriots, who saw reunification and 
European Union (EU) integration as the way out of their international isolation, Annan Plan 
was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots, who had safeguarded their EU entry as the Republic of 
Cyprus (RoC).  As a result, Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided country. After that, the 
impact of the EU on Turkey's strategy towards Cyprus has changed significantly. Due to a 
variety of issues related to the EU and most importantly its less clear EU accession prospects, 
Turkey has displayed less flexibility compared with the pre-Annan era. This investigation of 
the 'Europeanisation' of Ankara's Cyprus policy in this post-2004 era is the aim of this 
chapter.  
 
The first part of this chapter introduces the conceptual framework of Europeanisation. The 
second part reflects on the importance of the Cyprus problem for Turkey; and on how 
Brussels affected Ankara's stance towards the dispute in the years leading up to the EU 
accession of Cyprus. In the third and main section, the various issues that shape the EU's 
influence on Turkey's position on the problem are discussed: these include the outcome of the 
Annan Plan referendums, the Greek-Cypriot stance towards the dispute and Turkey, Turkey's 
progress in EU accession and, lastly, rising Turkish Euroscepticism. Finally, a conclusion 
summarises the main arguments of the chapter, which largely draws on the analyses of 
official documents, policy discourse and elite interviews.  
 
Europeanisation and foreign policy: a conceptual framework  
Notwithstanding the suggested 'many faces of Europeanisation' (Olsen 2002), the majority of 
the literature seeks to explain Europeanisation as a process via which the EU impacts 
domestic setting. In a seminal work, Ladrech terms Europeanisation as a:  
'process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that 
European [Union] political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organisational logic of  national politics and policy-making' (1994: 69).   
 
Indeed, this chapter follows the widespread understanding of Europeanisation as the process 
via which the EU impacts domestic politics, policy and polity (Ladrech 1994; Börzel 1999; 
Wallace 2000; Hix and Goetz 2001; Töller 2010). With an increased focus on change 
(Featherstone 2003), Börzel and Risse (2002) have attempted a useful categorisation of the 
degree of change produced at the domestic level between absorption (minimal degree of 
change), accommodation (modest degree of change), and finally, transformation (large 
degree of change). This chapter focuses on policy change and, in particular, the impact of the 
EU on the Cyprus issue as a major foreign policy matter for the EU candidate Turkey.  
 
Indeed, EU enlargement constitutes a fast-growing branch of the Europeanisation literature, 
which aims to investigate how the process of accession has impacted candidate countries, 
with an added focus on conditionality (e.g. Grabbe 2001; Vachudova 2003; Glenn 2004). An 
important difference in conceptualising Europeanisation in the context of enlargement is that 
the process of EU-induced change has a much more 'top-down' character: when discussing 
the situation of the EU members states, Europeanisation is better understood as both a 'top-
down' and 'bottom- up' process (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 20): a 'circular' rather than a 
unidirectional phenomenon (Goetz 2002), whereby EU member states can 'upload' and 
'download' policies at the same time (Connolly 2008); and shape and adapt to EU policy 
outcomes (Börzel and Risse 2002). In contrast, EU accession is better conceptualised as a 
predominantly top-down process, since the power asymmetry in favour of Brussels does not 
allow candidate countries to affect EU decision-making or the conditionality that becomes an 
avenue of their 'Europeanisation'.  
 
This rather asymmetrical power equilibrium is also obvious in conditionality via which the 
EU might cause domestic change. Sedelmeier (2011) draws attention on the variable of the 
credibility of conditionality, which has two sides: on the one hand, candidates must be sure 
that meeting conditionality will bring the reward of EU membership ('carrot' of membership). 
On the other hand, the EU should also be explicit that failure to satisfy conditionality will 
lead to suspension of the promised reward ('stick'). Besides, the credibility of EU membership 
prize is also very important for the public support for EU accession, which seems to to 
provide governments with additional room for Europeanisation-induced reforms (Agh 1999: 
841; Lippert et. al. 2001: 1001-1002).  
 
Finally, the experience of EU enlargement is also very relevant to the so-called 'goodness of  
fit' thesis (Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003), 
which suggests that the bigger the 'misfit' between EU and national policies or structures the 
greater the degree of Europeanisation-induced change is. For example this was the case for 
the CEECs that joined the EU in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements as well as Croatia that is 
about to become an EU member in July 2013. Discussing foreign policy, which lies at the 
centre of our investigation, Tsartsanidis and Stavridis (2005: 220) suggest that 
Europeanisation is best tested in 'difficult cases', in which foreign policy aims contradict the 
EU's agenda; and that Europeanisation is best conceptualised as a transformation of past 
national foreign policy priorities.  
 
Hereby, Europeanisation is deployed to investigate the EU’s impact on the foreign policy of  
Turkey as a candidate for EU membership and, in particular, the Cyprus issue. Until now, the 
literature has extensively discussed how the promise of EU membership triggered a radical 
shift in Turkey's policy on the Cyprus front, mostly manifested in more flexibility and 
support for reunification based on the Annan Plan (e.g. Çelenk 2007; Suvarierol 2003). 
Although there is indeed evidence of significant Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy in 
this regard, research seems to concentrate on the years leading-up to the referendums on the 
UN-proposed plan. However, more recent years have seen a variety of new developments, 
not least the failure of reunification plan and the EU accession of the RoC, coupled with a 
decreasing momentum in Turkey's EU accession. For that reason, the post-Annan era 
becomes particularly significant in understanding to what extent the 'Europeanisation' of 
Turkish foreign policy continues in the same way and degree. The pre- and post-Annan eras 
are addressed respectively in the next two sections.  
 
The Pre-Annan era: the European Union catalyst  
Undoubtedly, the Cyprus problem has been a 'totemic' issue of Turkish foreign policy agenda. 
For years, the government of Turkey had been rather inflexible towards the prospects of a 
solution (e.g. Kazan 2002). After Cyprus gained independence as RoC, the partnership state 
between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, ongoing inter-communal conflict led to the 
gradual division of the island into two administrative and territorial zones: the once bi-
communal RoC is monopolised by the Greek-Cypriots in the south, while Turkish-Cypriots 
retired in the north under their secessionist state of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC), which was self-declared in 1983. Until today, the international community does not 
recognise the Turkish-Cypriot administration and continues to regard the now Greek-Cypriot-
led RoC as the legitimate government of the country. In contrast, Ankara has showed a 
continuous support to the autonomous existence of Turkish-Cypriots. This position often 
implicated the efforts for reunification based on a federative basis, as agreed by the two 
communities of the island and supported by the international community1. Despite this 
historical inflexibility, the prospects of EU membership led to a profound 'Europeanisation' of 
Turkish policy towards the Cyprus issue.  
 
                                                      
1  In 1977, the two communities signed the 'four point agreement', which set the basic principles for negotiations: 
any solution should be based on a federal, bi-communal and non-aligned state, where the territorial division should 
not be strictly based on population ratio (Fisher 2001: 315). 
The EU's influence on Ankara's policy towards the Cyprus issue began with the application 
of the RoC, as represented by the Greek-Cypriots3, for EU membership in 1990. In those 
early stages of Cyprus' accession, the EU seemed to (indirectly) strengthen Turkish 
intransigence. The application of the Greek-Cypriots in the name of the country as a whole 
frustrated both Ankara and north Nicosia and hardened their position (see Çelenk 2007: 350; 
Suvarierol 2003: 58). In 1998, the opening of EU accession negotiations for the RoC but not 
for Turkey pushed Ankara to further intransigence; and it resulted in the signing of a joint 
declaration by Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots TRNC that provided for greater integration 
between them Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots and attacked the legitimacy of Cyprus' EU 
accession process:  
 
‘…the EU membership of Cyprus can be taken up in discussions once the final 
political settlement is reached [...]as stipulated by the 1959 Zurich and London 
Agreements, Cyprus cannot join international political and economic unions to 
which Turkey and Greece are not members (Republic of Turkey 2008).’  
 
Until that moment, the role of the EU in Turkey's policy towards Cyprus was rather 
peripheral, given the low intensity of relations between Ankara and Brussels and the limited 
intentions of the latter to actively affect Turkey’s foreign agenda. However, the EU began to 
play a role in Ankara's policy towards Cyprus, when Turkey was recognised as a candidate 
for EU membership (European Council 1999) subject to its contribution to the resolution of 
the Cyprus problem.This set the stage for a transformative process of Europeanisation of 
Turkish foreign policy.  
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Turkey's 'ticket' for EU membership was meant to change the role of the EU in Ankara's 
stance vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem. Initially, Turkey stayed defensive. In reaction to the 
outcome of the Helsinki Summit, the then Turkish Prime Minister (PM) Bülent Ecevit stated 
that 'existence of the TRNC is inevitable not only for Turkish-Cypriots, but also for Turkey's 
security' (Anatolia, 1999). This support of the self-declared Turkish-Cypriot state 
contradicted international efforts for reunification based on a compromise and a federal 
formula. Even after the start of fresh UN-supported negotiations between Greek-Cypriots and 
Turkish-Cypriots in 2002, the Deputy PM Mesut Yılmaz reconfirmed Ankara's mantra that 
'there exist two different nations and two sovereign states in the island' and reiterated that 
Turkey's EU membership could not be associated with a settlement of the Cyprus Problem 
(Turkish Daily News, 2002a; 2002b). Nevertheless, a series of developments would put a 
dramatic end to this inflexible policy.  
 
First of all, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) 
in late 2002 changed Turkey's view of the Cyprus problem in relation to the EU. The new 
government put EU accession high on the list of its priorities and, therefore, supported 
resolution of the inter-communal dispute in Cyprus, which was included in the conditionality 
of EU accession. Indeed, this was a policy choice that yielded extensive public support, given 
the appeal that EU membership enjoyed (European Commission 2004b). As a result, shortly 
after the formation of the first AKP government, PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan set the tone for a 
more flexible position declaring that '[he was] not in favour of the continuation of the policy 
that [had] been maintained in Cyprus over the past thirty to forty years' (The Independent, 
2003).  
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In addition to the significance of EU accession for the newly elected government, a series of 
other factors contributed to a change in Ankara's policy towards the Cyprus problem, some of 
which still directly relate to the EU. Firstly, the clear parliamentary majority that the AKP 
secured allowed the party to make radical policy choices. A more flexible strategy was also 
welcome due to the strategic interest of Turkey in preventing a Greek-Cypriot-dominated 
state’s accession to the EU that could damage the country’s own European aspirations 
(Suvarierol 2003: 66) but also due to the growing as well as spreading Turkish-Cypriot pro-
solution attitudes (see also Christophorou 2005). At the same time, domestic scepticism 
against AKP's potentially Islamic agenda led Erdoğan to prioritise Cyprus settlement in order 
to gain international support and, through that, fortify his domestic position (Oktay and  
Kınacıoğlu 2006: 264). Finally, Turkey's improving ties with the EU member state Greece 
also played a positive role, as Ankara recognised that better relations between the two sides 
of the Aegean would contribute to its EU ambitions (Barkey and Gordon 2001; Ker-Lindsay 
2007). No matter how diverse, what lies behind all these developments was the strategic 
choice of Turkey to meet EU conditionality and fulfill its European aspirations.  
 
Along these lines, the prospects of EU membership and the accession conditionality led to a 
remarkable 'Europeanisation' and a major shift in Turkey's position towards the Cyprus 
dispute. The prioritisation of EU accession at both public and elite levels resulted in a change 
in the foreign policy towards Cyprus, largely in accordance with the conditionality imposed. 
In Europeanisation terms, the large 'misfit' between the long-standing inflexible policy 
towards the Cyprus problemand the flexibility that EU conditionality asked for facilitated the 
'transformation' of Turkey's foreign policy. As a result of Ankara's support and the pro-
solution/EU trend expressed in north Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriots favoured the Annan Plan in the 
referendums of April 2004. However, the rejection of the plan by the Greek-Cypriots put an end to 
Comment [FC4]: I don’t understand what you mean by this. Could you formulate it as a separate sentence please. Thanks! Done 
any hopes for reunification and Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided island latter that May, de 
facto represented by the Greek-Cypriots. The failure of reunification in turn had a significant impact 
on the trajectory of the Cyprus problem, Turkey's EU aspirations as well as Ankara's position vis-
à-vis the inter-communal dispute.  
 
The Post-Annan era: the failure of a catalyst?  
In the post-Annan era, a series of issues have shaped the Europeanisation of the Cyprus 
question in the foreign policy agenda of Turkey: The most important EU-related factors that 
impacted Turkey's policy are analysed below. These include: the Annan Plan referendums in 
both Cypriot communities and their outcome; the Greek-Cypriot position particularly towards 
Turkey's EU accession as expressed by the government on the RoC; the slow-down in 
Turkey's EU accession process; and finally, the rising Euroscepticism in Turkey.  
 
The Annan Plan referendums  
The Annan Plan was the most thorough effort to resolve the inter-communal dispute to date. 
In this regard, the outcome of the referendums sent waves of disappointment to the 
international community. The Greek-Cypriot side, which was traditionally seen as more 
flexible, voted against resolution, while the Turkish-Cypriots favoured reunification. Here, 
prospects of EU integration impacted the two Cypriot communities in very different fashions: 
for Greek-Cypriots, disapproval of the plan was regarded an instrument to secure accession to 
the EU alone and to strengthen their diplomatic position. On the contrary, Turkish-Cypriots 
backed the plan, also because for them it meant the realisation of their European integration, 
which could provide a series of advantages for the isolated community. 2  However, the                                                       2  This is based on interviews that I conducted in 2009 with a member of Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of 
Commerce and with a member of the Communal Democracy Party. 
rejection of the Plan by the Greek-Cypriots led to an unexpected wave of sympathy to the 
Turkish-Cypriots as a result of their positive stance towards reunification and their unfulfilled 
aspirations for a future in the EU (General Affairs Council 2004). Simultaneously, the 
referendum results triggered wide frustration with the Greek-Cypriot side that was even 
considered to have 'cheated' the EU (EUObserver, 2004). This resulted in a new balance of 
power that was recognised by Ankara and by PM Erdoğan:  
'New conditions have emerged in the island after the referenda [...] this new 
tableau [...] has made our country the advantageous side for the first time during 
the history of [the] Cyprus question [sic].' (Anatolia News, 2004)  
 
Consequently, Turkey took the opportunity to harden its position towards the Cyprus problem 
and very often underlined that it was now the turn of the Greek-Cypriot side to show 
goodwill (NTV 2004). In the midst of numerous calls for ending the isolation of northern 
Cyprus, Turkey also suggested that the Turkish-Cypriots should be rewarded for their 
positive stance on the Annan Plan, mainly via a lift of international economic embargo 
against them (Turkish Weekly 2005a; 2005b). Lastly, Ankara repeated the argument that 
Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Plan meant the continuation of the status quo in Cyprus, an 
anomalous EU accession of a divided island and an administration (i.e. the RoC) that did not 
represent the Turkish-Cypriots. In comparison to previous Turkish governments references to 
the self-declared TRNC were still scarce. Nevertheless, there was now a clearer advocacy of 
the separate existence and self-determination of the Turkish-Cypriots. Indeed, the Annan Plan 
provisions of two equal states actually seems to have informed Ankara's argument about the  
political equality between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (Anatolia 2005).  
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In this regard, the aftermath of the Annan Plan has contributed to a continuation of the 
'Europeanisation' of Turkey's policy on Cyprus, however, in the rather opposite direction. The 
EU, by failing to trigger pro-solution attitudes in both sides of the 'Green Line' and 
welcoming a divided island to its circles, led to a hardening of Turkish policy towards 
Cyprus. This was also due to the loss of international credibility that the Greek-Cypriot side 
suffered from and the contrasting trend of understanding towards the Turkish-Cypriots. 
Although, initially, Turkey's policy on the inter-communal problem continued to be rather 
compromising, each side's voting behaviour on the Annan Plan became a source of increased 
Turkish confidence, and, in a way, allowed Ankara to claim that they have met the 
conditionality related to the Cyprus problem by supporting the resolution plan. Many years 
after, the referendums continue to inspire Ankara's rhetoric:  Turkey's less compromising 
policy towards the inter- communal dispute is often linked to the Greek-Cypriot rejection of 
the Annan Plan and the then contrasting flexible position of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots 
(eg. Turkish Press, 2008; The Sunday Times, 2012).  
 
The Greek-Cypriot position  
The EU accession of Cyprus in 2004 caused a fundamental change in the relations between 
RoC, Turkey, Turkish-Cypriots and the EU. In effect, Brussels’ neutrality in the Cyprus 
problem has ceased to exist, since one major party to the dispute – Greek-Cypriots as 
represented by the RoC – is now part of the EU itself, with important leverage over EU’s 
position through participation in the EU decision-making mechanisms and the potential 
exercise of the veto power in a number of issues. This added to the deterioration of relations 
between the RoC and Turkey; and to the EU-influenced hardening of Turkish stance against 
the Cyprus problem.  
 
One of Ankara's greatest concerns was that the EU accession of Cyprus in the administrative 
face of the RoC would significantly increase the Greek-Cypriot diplomatic power and pose 
hermetic barriers to Turkey's own EU accession. Indeed, the RoC has played an important 
role in the staggering accession process of Turkey. A few months after joining the EU, 
Greek-Cypriots presented a 'shopping list' of demands that expected to be addressed by 
Turkey before opening of accession negotiations (Faustmann 2011). Although this exhaustive 
list of requirements was eventually dropped after peer-pressure from other member states, the 
ratification of the Additional Protocol, which extends the Turkey-EU custom union to all EU 
member states, including the RoC, was linked to the opening of EU accession negotiations 
with Turkey (European Commission 2005: 6).  
 
Ankara signed the Protocol but issued a declaration that the signature did neither amount to 
recognition of the RoC nor the opening of Turkish ports to it (Republic of Turkey 2005). 
Despite the Greek-Cypriot objections, accession negotiations with Turkey were opened in 
2005 but the RoC has continued to pose challenges to Turkey's EU road throughout the 
negotiations process. Most importantly, in 2006, the EU decided not to open eight chapters to 
negotiation and not to conclude the negotiation of any chapters before Ankara implements the 
Protocol (Council of the EU 2006). At the same time, the Greek Cypriots have used their 
membership power to affect Turkey-EU relations beyond the strictly-speaking accession 
process. For example, in 2011, the RoC tried to veto Turkish participation in EU-Syrian talks 
on the Syrian crisis (Today's Zaman, 2011). Moreover, the RoC has often deployed their 
leverage over Turkey’s EU accession negotiations to force Ankara to take a more flexible 
stance on many other matters, such as the Greek-Cypriot efforts for gas exploitation (Reuters, 
2011). However, instead of leading to flexibility, the Greek-Cypriot efforts were matched 
with Turkish exploratory oil drills in northern Cyprus (BBC News, 2012).  
 Another issue that informed the inflexible Turkish position towards the Cyprus problem has 
been the Greek-Cypriot efforts to veto greater integration between the EU and Turkish-
Cypriots. After their positive vote on the Annan Plan, the EU suggested that it would be 
unfair to leave the Turkish-Cypriots 'out in the cold' (European Commission 2004c). 
Therefore, the Council declared its determination:  
'to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate 
the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging [their] economic development' 
(General Affairs Council 2004)’.  
 
Following the 'Green Line Regulation' (Council of the EU 2004), which aims to regulate 
movement of goods and persons across the 'Green Line' and promote Turkish-Cypriot 
economy, the European Commission proposed two instruments for the assistance of Turkish-
Cypriots: the Direct Trade Regulation (European Commission 2004d), which aims to foster 
trade between the EU and northern Cyprus, and the 'Financial Aid Regulation' (Council of the 
EU 2006b), which broadly targets development and preparation for implementation of the EU 
law in the Turkish-Cypriot community. Although the Financial Aid Regulation was adopted 
in 2006, the Direct Trade Regulation remains on the table due to opposition by the Greek-
Cypriots, who suggest that implementation equals to recognition of the self-declared Turkish-
Cypriot state. This Greek-Cypriot position has been a long-lasting source of frustration both 
in northern Cyprus and Turkey.3 Indeed, Ankara very often conditions the full application of 
the Additional Protocol on the implementation of the Direct Trade Regulation (BBC News, 
2006).                                                        3 This is based on interviews conducted in 2009 with a member of the EU Coordination Centre and with a 
Turkish-Cypriot Leadership Representative. 
 In this context, Turkey's policy towards the Cyprus problem has hardened also due to the 
Greek-Cypriot strategy to push towards stricter EU conditionality and other concessions. 
Although the EU has managed to partially mediate the assertiveness with which Greek-
Cypriots have deployed advantages of membership, RoC has still informed a stricter EU 
conditionality. Besides, the EU entry of the RoC has created more practical challenges for 
Turkish foreign policy that go beyond the previously relatively abstract political 
conditionality merely calling for Turkey’s support to the resolution process in Cyprus (e.g. 
Helsinki 1999). In contrast, now Turkey is specifically asked, for instance, to implement the 
additional Protocol. As a result of this accelerating linkage between Cyprus problem and 
Turkey's EU accession conditionality, the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign policy takes 
the form of further inflexibility vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem, most prominently reflected in 
the refusal to fully implement the Additional Protocol. Despite causing short-term 
inflexibility, the diplomatic stance of the Greek-Cypriots contributes to the credibility of 
conditionality as a 'tool' of Europeanisation: the 'stick' here is particularly explicit and it is 
clear that in absence of a contribution to the resolution of the Cyprus problem, the EU, under 
the pressure of the RoC, will not allow Turkey to enter the EU. However, this is only one 
aspect of conditionality. As discussed below, the 'carrot' of membership is not as clear 
anymore, thus undermining the overall credibility of conditionality in the post-Annan era 
Europeanisation process.  
 
Slow-down in Turkey's EU accession process  
Ankara's position towards the Cyprus problem has also been mediated by the overall slow-  
down of Turkey's EU accession process. In addition to Turkey’s indeed very important 
refusal to implement the Additional Protocol, a range of other issues has erected barriers in 
Turkey's path towards EU accession. First of all, the enlargement strategy as a whole has seen 
a decrease in importance as a result of various crises that have tarnished the EU in recent 
years. Indeed, the expansion policy itself suffered an important fatigue, following the 
accession of twelve new states in 2004 and 2007. Naturally, the biggest victim of this crisis 
was Turkey, which constituted the most challenging enlargement case at this point (Eralp 
2009). In addition, the crisis on constitutional reform, the Lisbon Treaty and the more recent 
Eurozone crisis have shifted the EU's attention to internal matters and  have made 
enlargement a less important matter in the agenda.  
 
All together, the rise of European scepticism towards Turkey’s accession at both public and 
elite level, especially in front-line members of French and German politics has also slowed 
down the accession process (Reuters 2007). Indeed, Germany has repeatedly proposed 
'privileged partnership' as an alternative to Turkish EU membership (Hürriyet Daily News, 
2010). Similarly, French ex-President Nicolas Sarkozy has opposed to Turkey’s EU 
membership and controversially claimed that: 'Europe has been lying about its borders. 
Turkey is in Asia Minor and not in Europe' (Euractiv, 2011). The recently elected  new 
French President Francois Hollande raised expectations for less resistance to Turkey's EU 
accession but the position of the new leadership remains unclear (Huf Post World 2012). 
Lastly, other influential EU figures are also thought took sceptical positions towards full EU 
membership of Turkey. For example, despite abstaining from inflammatory rhetoric after his 
election to the post of Presidency of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy had 
previously fervently opposed Turkey’s EU accession suggesting that: 
‘Turkey is not […] and will never be part of Europe […] The universal values 
which are in force in Europe, and which are fundamental values of Christianity, 
will loose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country.’ (Telegraph, 2009)  
 At the same time, public attitudes also recorded rising reservations towards Turkey's EU 
membership. For example, the referendums on the constitutional Treaty in 2008 were 
dominated by issues related to Turkey's EU accession; and it showcased a lot of scepticism 
towards the country (European Commission 2010). Lastly, the Cyprus problem itself and the 
related Greek-Cypriot effort to push for concessions from Ankara have posed a very large 
barrier against Turkey's EU aspirations and a fast-track progress of integration.  
 
Consequently, the momentum created in Helsinki in 1999 has been reversed and so have the 
incentives provided to Ankara for a decisively contributing position towards solution of the 
Cyprus problem. In an era in which the EU needs to address several domestic matters before 
pursuing further expansion, the entire enlargement strategy has been hit. But, more 
specifically, Turkey's EU aspirations have further been damaged by rising scepticism towards 
the country's accession. In this regard, the decreasing importance of Turkey within EU 
enlargement and numerous calls for alternative ways of association between the two sides has 
resulted in limited Turkish motivation to fast act with regard to conditionality as a whole, let 
alone the sensitive Cyprus problem. Indeed, the decreasing ability of the EU to promote 
change in the absence of a clear 'reward' is most indicative of the importance of 
conditionality's credibility for the process of Europeanisation.  
 
Turkish Euroscepticism  
This slow-down in Ankara-Brussels relations has also had an impact on domestic Turkish 
politics and Turkish public attitudes towards the EU. Largely as a result of the staggering 
accession progress, the public has lost their early zeal about a European future: the support 
for EU membership has dropped from 62 percent in 2004 to 37 percent in 2012 (European 
Commission 2004 and 2012 respectively). Consequently, domestic eurospectic elites have 
obtained more power and this, in turn, makes EU accession a gradually costly option for the 
AKP government (Hannay 2006), especially if it means more concessions in the sensitive 
Cyprus problem. Accordingly, the arguments for 'privileged partnership' have not been well 
received by the governing Turkish elites. For example, chief EU negotiator Egemen Bağış 
has stated that 'such a thing as privileged partnership does not exist [and] I feel insulted for 
being offered something which does not exist' (BBC News 2010), while Turkish President 
Abdullah Gül has reiterated that full EU membership continues to be the main objective of 
Ankara (Today's Zaman 2011).  
 
In this regard, the diminishing public support to the EU has further limited the government's  
room for flexible positions in the name of EU accession. The extensive pro- Europeanism 
that prevailed in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit and the credible European future of 
Turkey together provided flexibility for concessions on the Cyprus problem that facilitated 
the EU accession objective. However, the decreasing positive image of the EU, which 
directly relates to the failure of Brussels to sustain a clear accession promise, limits the 
options available to the Turkish government for compromises in the Cyprus problem. Indeed, 
Ankara has obtained more intransigent positions vis-à-vis the inter-communal dispute and 
this is an EU effect on the country's strategy towards Cyprus.  
 
Conclusions 
The process of EU accession has significantly impacted on Ankara's foreign policy and 
position towards the Cyprus problem. The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU 
membership in 1999, the election of the AKP three years later and the extensive public 
support altogether cultivated in the EU’s becoming a policy objective of paramount 
importance for Turkey. In this regard the EU triggered a top-down 'transformation' of 
Turkey's foreign policy in the form of more flexibility towards the Cyprus problem, which 
was included in the conditionality of Turkey's EU accession. Indeed, the 'misfit' between the 
long-standing inflexible Turkish policies towards Cyprus and the contribution to the 
resolution of the dispute that EU conditionality asked for resulted in the significant 
Europeanisation and shift in Turkish foreign policy.  
 
The post-Annan era represents a different picture, mostly defined by a decrease in the clarity 
of the EU membership reward and, therefore, less credible conditionality. 'Europeanisation' 
of the Turkish Foreign Policy continues but a variety of reasons have led to a less flexible 
position towards the inter-communal dispute, which does not resemble the pre-Annan degree 
of 'transformation' of policy. Albeit the Turkish foreign policy still continues to be more 
flexible than what it used to be before the start of accession process, there is a notable 
hardening of rhetoric compared with the compromising positions adopted in the process 
leading to the Annan Plan. In this regard, although the staggering negotiations on the Cyprus 
problem do not allow for a full revelation of Turkey's position, examples of inflexibility 
include Ankara's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol and its increasingly hostile 
rhetoric that blames the Greek-Cypriot side for the pending division of the island.  
 
A first source of this inflexibility is the Greek-Cypriot entry to the EU despite their rejection 
of the Annan Plan in contrast to the Turkish-Cypriot support for reunification. Furthermore, 
the Greek-Cypriot efforts to use EU membership in order to impose strict conditionality and 
to secure Turkish flexibility over many matters have further hardened Ankara's position. 
Nevertheless, this more explicit and, therefore, credible conditionality might set the stage for 
the long-term Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards more flexible positions, 
since it makes the 'stick' much more explicit: it is now clear that a failure to normalise 
relations with the RoC and a failure to contribute towards a compromised resolution of the 
Cyprus conflict could stop Turkey’s EU accession process altogether.  
 
the credibility of conditionality, there are other factors in place that diminish the credibility of 
conditionality. Firstly, the momentum in the relations between Turkey and the EU has been 
lost, due to various crises that Brussels have been facing and due to growing scepticism 
against Turkey's EU accession. In this regard, the credibility of conditionality has been 
reduced: although the conditions that need to be met remain very explicit, the decreasing 
clarity of the reward of EU membership has unavoidably led to a decline of the EU's 
influence on Turkey's agenda and, equally, less motivation to pursue policies. EU objective. 
Secondly, the staggering process of EU accession has led to a loss of EU popularity amongst 
Turkish society, which makes EU-informed concessions on the Cyprus problem all the less 
favourable. Here, the contrast between the early pro- Europeanism amongst Turks and their 
post-Annan Euroscepticism is evident from for the mediating power of public support in the 
process of Europeanisation.  
 
Therefore, in the post-Annan era, the Europeanisation of Turkey's foreign policy towards the 
Cyprus problem does continue to, more or less, the same degree, but in a rather different way. 
In recent years, the EU has not provided enough incentives to Ankara to contribute to a 
compromising solution. However, this does not mean that the EU does not continue to 
influence Ankara's position towards the inter-communal dispute. On the contrary, this chapter 
has reflected on a range of EU-related factors that have triggered a less flexible position of 
Ankara. Indeed, with the negotiations on the Cyprus problem lacking momentum compared 
with the pre-2004 era, Ankara does not need to take a very clear stance in this issue. 
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Likewise, although Turkey's policy towards Cyprus is more flexible than before the 
beginning of its EU accession process, Ankara's rhetoric does not reflect the level of 
compromise adopted just before to the Annan Plan referendums.  
 
It is, thus, challenging to comment on whether the stance and rhetoric of Ankara will stay as  
inflexible if and when resolution of the Cyprus problem will become a more realistic prospect 
towards which all sides of the dispute will need to 'show their cards'. Moreover, this will 
depend on a variety of factors, some of which do not fall within the scope of this chapter. 
Indeed, peripheral security matters, like the Arab Spring or the Syrian war, have reduced the 
importance of the Cyprus problem in Turkish foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, it is 
certain that the European future of Turkey will continue to be directly linked to the inter-
communal dispute in the Mediterranean island, especially after the EU accession of the RoC. 
If Turkey continues to aspire to a full EU accession, Ankara will have to realise that Turkey’s 
way to Europe passes through Cyprus. As a result, a significant degree of compromise needs 
to be displayed during any potential future negotiations on the Cyprus problem, such as the 
full implementation of the Additional Protocol. In this regard, conditionality continues to be 
an instrument by which Brussels can promote flexibility of Turkey towards the Cyprus 
problem. However, this chapter has debated the several factors that might mediate EU 
conditionality and decrease its effectiveness or, actually, trigger results in the opposite 
direction (i.e. further inflexibility). Therefore, at the opposite end of this peculiar 'security 
dilemma', the EU should draw lessons from the pre-Annan period and recognise that, the only 
tool in their search to affect Turkey's position towards Cyprus is a credible promise for EU 
accession. And since the recent decrease in the clarity of the EU reward relates to factors 
beyond the Cyprus problem (e.g. wider Turkoscepticism), it is perhaps the EU that should 
take the first step and address the deadlock in its relations with Turkey. Despite the 
challenging road ahead for both sides, it is this investigation of the differentiated EU impact 
on Turkish foreign policy in both the pre and post-Annan eras that is suggestive of an, indeed, 
ongoing and exceptional process of Europeanisation. 
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